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ABSTRACT
Business analytics, defined as the use of data to make better, more relevant,
evidence-based business decisions, has received a great deal of attention in
practitioner circles. Organizations have adopted business analytics in an effort to
improve revenue, product placement, and customer satisfaction. Professional
sports teams are no different. While analytics has been used for over 30 years, the
use of analytics by professional sports teams is a relatively new concept. However,
it is unclear whether the teams that have adopted analytics are seeing any results.
If not, then perhaps analytics is not the right solution. Analyses across the four,
major U.S. sports leagues and within leagues show little to no competitive (on-field)
or attendance (off-field) differences for the teams that have adopted analytics.
Areas for additional research are provided in order to better understand the
apparent disconnect between the hype in the sports industry and the lack of
measurable results.
KEYWORDS: Analytics, Professional Sports, Analytics Adoption, Team
Performance

ANALYTICS AND DECISION-MAKING
A hot topic in corporate Information Technology (IT) departments and board rooms
over the last few years is business analytics (Gaines, 2013; White, 2013; Deutsch,
2014; Underwood, 2014). Business analytics, for this paper, is defined as the use
of data to make better, more relevant, evidence-based business decisions. Business
analytics includes the techniques and the technologies used to make these decisions.
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A key component to successful business analytics is the availability of large
quantities of high quality data.
Organizations and industries adopt analytics to improve revenue, product
placement, customer satisfaction, customer returns, etc. Numerous studies (e.g.,
Elbashir et al., 2011; Shanks & Bekmamedova, 2012; and Seddon et al., 2012) have
investigated how business analytics impacts and influences organizational
performance. Like any new technology, tool, or process, organizations need to see
its value (through improvements in efficiencies, effectiveness, or organizational
performance) in order for its adoption to make sense; otherwise, the organization
can achieve the same results without spending the extra time/money (White, 2013;
Deutsch, 2014; Underwood, 2014). This can be viewed as business analytics’
return on investment, a measure that can be difficult to calculate (James, 2014;
McCann, 2014).
Industries and organizations outside the traditional players (retailing,
manufacturing, and service industries) are also utilizing business analytics.
Professional sports teams utilize analytics for game management, player
development and personnel decisions, training and practice methods, marketing,
ticket pricing, and financial decision-making (Maxcy & Drayer, 2014). With global
revenues for professional sports teams expected near $150 billion (Clark, 2011),
there is ample incentive to use analytics to maximize on-field performance and
revenue (off-field performance) in an industry that is competitive by its very nature.
Sports teams, and matches (games) in particular, create an abundance of data and
statistics, and the analysis of these data is as old as the sports themselves
(Chadwick, 1867; Schumaker et al., 2010). A key component to any team is its
ability to win and to do so consistently. Effective analysis of team and individual
data provides owners, managers, trainers, scouts, and players with a better
understanding of past performance.
The more recent advances and improvements in computing power and analysis
tools have enabled decision-makers within the professional sports to apply analytics
to the already vast quantity of data. However, analytics approaches across the
sports industry and among the teams are diverse in terms of usage and underlying
enthusiasm (Alamar, 2013). Recent works by Maxcy & Drayer (2014) and ESPN
(2015) have shed light on the analytics usage and practices of professional sports
teams, but the connection between analytics utilization and team
performance/success is unclear.
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This leads to the following research questions: 1) Do teams utilizing analytics
perform better on and/or off the field? and 2) Is there a difference in performance
by sport/league?

ANALYTICS AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Analytics adoption and utilization by professional sports teams dates back to the
late 1970s (Maxcy & Drayer, 2014; Schumaker et al., 2010), though the term
“analytics” was not in use. In the late 1970s, Bill James led a revolution in sports
statistics within professional baseball. James and his colleagues attempted to
develop statistics and measures of performance that correlated directly with onfield performance (i.e., winning). New measures, such as OPS (On-Base Plus
Slugging) and WAR/WARP (Wins Above Replacement Player), began as empirical
evaluations by individual researchers and have since made their way into the
mainstream of baseball reporting and analysis. As these measures emerged, some
general managers and managers understood their value and their potential for
improving performance.
Perhaps the most well-known example of this is from the Oakland A’s in the late
1990s and early 2000s. Under general managers Sandy Alderson and then Billy
Beane, the Oakland A’s built their team using analytics and a modest
budget/payroll. This story became a book – Moneyball: The Art of Winning an
Unfair Game (Lewis, 2004) – and then a motion picture. While the A’s never won
the World Series, they did make the playoffs in four consecutive seasons. Their
story inspired other teams to incorporate similar techniques, with the Boston Red
Sox as the prime example of ultimate success – three World Series titles in a tenyear span from 2004-2013. However, even with the success stories of the Oakland
A’s and the Boston Red Sox, not all teams have embraced analytics. Many teams
still employ large scouting offices for traditional player evaluation and assessment,
and others feel that the emphasis on statistics and analytics has taken the focus away
from the actual game of baseball (Kettmann, 2015).
While not nearly as well-known outside of the sport as the previous examples with
baseball, professional basketball teams have been using Advanced Scout for nearly
twenty years. This data mining software has been used most often to maximize
substitution schemes (Bhandari et al., 1997).
The most common use of analytics in professional sports is not by the teams
themselves but by individual researchers. These super-fans (like Bill James) have
interests in sports statistics, history, and analytics that span all possible perspectives
and motives. From baseball (Hirotsu & Wright, 2003; Freeman, 2004; Albert,
2008; Xu et al., 2015), soccer/football (Barros & Leach, 2006; Tovar, 2014),
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harness track racing (Schumaker 2013a, 2013b), hockey (Thomas, 2006; Pettigrew,
2014), and just about every other sport, professional sports continue to be
scrutinized by individuals. However, this paper focuses on the adoption of analytics
by professional sports teams, regardless of techniques, measures, or technologies
used.
Maxcy and Drayer (2014) reported the following analytics adoption levels within
the four, major U.S. sports leagues: Major League Baseball (MLB) – 97%, or 29
out of 30 teams; the National Basketball Association (NBA) – 80%, or 24 out of 30
teams; the National Football League (NFL) – 56%, or 18 out of 32 teams; and the
National Hockey League (NHL) – 23%, or 7 out of 30 teams. A team was
considered to have adopted analytics if the team employed analytics professionals
as staff or consultants.
In early 2015, ESPN the Magazine and ESPN.com released an assessment of each
of the 122 teams in the four, major U.S. sports leagues (ESPN, 2015). Each team,
within each league, received a categorical ranking indicating “the strength of each
franchise’s analytics staff, its buy-in from execs and coaches, its investment in
biometric data and how much its approach is predicated on analytics” (ESPN,
2015). Based on expert opinions, internal team sources, team evaluations, and
statistical analysis, the categories are: 1-All-In, 2-Believers, 3-One Foot In, 4Skeptics, and 5-Nonbelievers. Table 1 provides the categorizations for each of the
leagues as well as the adoption percentages from Maxcy and Drayer (2014). In
addition to the categorizations, ESPN (2015) ranked the overall top 10 and bottom
10 teams across all four leagues combined with the rest of the teams (#11-112) not
ranked. The full categorization of each of the 122 teams as well as their ranking (if
applicable) can be found in the Appendix.
ESPN

ESPN

ESPN

ESPN

ESPN

Maxcy
and
League Category Category Category Category Category Drayer
1
2
3
4
5
MLB

9

7

6

6

2

97%

NBA

4

8

9

6

3

80%

NFL

0

9

7

12

4

56%

NHL

1

13

12

3

1

23%
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Table 1: Team categorizations by league (ESPN, 2015) and adoption
percentages (Maxcy & Drayer, 2014)
Table 1 shows that of all the teams ranked as Category 1 (All-In), over 60% are
MLB teams. It appears that the NFL has been the slowest (most resistant?) to
analytics implementation with exactly half of the 32 teams in Categories 4 and 5,
while the NHL has a large number of teams (over 80%) that are either just getting
started or on their way. It is difficult to reconcile the categorizations from ESPN
(2015) with the percentages from Maxcy and Drayer (2014) since both used
different techniques and processes. Regardless, given the thoroughness and level
of research and data collection in ESPN (2015), these categorizations will be
utilized throughout the remainder of this study.

HYPOTHESES
Perhaps the simplest to calculate and easiest to understand, a team’s winning
percentage is a clear indication of its on-field success. For most executives,
managers, players, and fans, winning games is the primary goal. Nearly every
aspect of sports is about finding ways to increase a team’s winning percentage. This
leads to the first hypothesis.
H1 – Teams with higher analytics categorizations and rankings have higher
winning percentages
In addition to a team’s on-field performance measured by its winning percentage,
a team’s off-field performance can be measured by the number of fans watching
the live games. This is considered an off-field performance measure as the primary
impact of more fans is an increase in revenue from ticket sales, concession sales,
and merchandise and souvenir sales. Across a full season, the total home attendance
for any team can be measured against the potential seating capacity for that team’s
stadium/arena. Teams that perform better should draw more fans. This leads to the
second hypothesis.
H2 – Teams with higher analytics categorizations and rankings have higher
attendance percentages relative to stadium capacity
Of the four leagues under consideration, none of them is new. While there are
league differences in operating rules regarding issues such as salary caps,
eligibility, free agency, and revenue sharing, no league has an unfair advantage or
disadvantage utilizing technology, including analytics. Team owners are often
some of the wealthiest individuals in a team’s city, if not the country (Solomon,
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2013), and should be able to afford additional technology and/or staff. This leads
to the third hypothesis.
H3 – There is no difference in analytics’ impact across the four leagues

ON-FIELD AND OFF-FIELD PERFORMANCE DATA
Using the tiered categorizations and the top 10 (1-10) and bottom 10 (113-122)
rankings in ESPN (2015) as a starting point, additional data were collected.
For each of the 2013 and 2014 regular seasons, the number of victories were
gathered from league-based season standings available from ESPN.com (e.g.,
http://espn.go.com/nhl/standings/_/year/2014). Given the differences across the
leagues’ schedules, team victories on their own do not provide comparable data.
Therefore, winning percentages were calculated for each team in each year based
on the team’s number of victories divided by the number of games played. In the
NFL, ties are possible – ties do not show up in the number of victories, but ties do
count as “half” a victory when calculating a winning percentage. Additionally, in
the NHL, winning percentages are traditionally calculated based on team victories
and overtime/shootout losses. Therefore, using the point system in the NHL of two
points for a victory (of any type) and one point for an overtime/shootout loss, the
winning percentage is calculated as the number of points earned divided by the total
points possible for the full season.
For each of the 2013 and 2014 regular seasons, the season’s stadium attendance
percentage was gathered from league-based attendance reports available from
ESPN.com (e.g., http://espn.go.com/nhl/attendance/_/year/2014/). This number is
derived by taking the total attendance at home games for each team and dividing
that number by the stadium’s capacity for all home games combined. Because
stadiums oversell their official capacity and allow standing room only (SRO)
tickets, it is possible for a team to have a seasonal attendance percentage greater
than 100%. As a result, stadium attendance percentage treats filling a 40,000-seat
baseball stadium to capacity as the same as filling a 19,000-seat hockey arena to
capacity.

ANALYSES
The ESPN (2015) categorizations and rankings were published in early 2015 based
on actual events, decisions, and work by each team during 2014. Therefore, the
2014 season is the most relevant season that will reflect the variance in the
categorizations and rankings. Data from the 2013 season are also available, but this
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season occurred prior to the work of ESPN (2015). It is unknown how teams would
have been categorized and ranked during the 2013 season.
In essence, using a categorization from year n, one can analyze performance in year
n (or n+1). However, one cannot analyze performance in year n-1 based on the
categorization in year n. The only use of data from year n-1 is to measure the
change in performance from year n-1 to year n, thereby measuring the impact of
the categorization in year n on both the performance in year n and the change in
performance from year n-1.
WINNING PERCENTAGE
H1 states that teams with higher analytics categorizations and teams ranked in the
top 10 (compared to the bottom 10) should have higher winning percentages than
teams categorized or ranked lower. It is expected that teams in Category 1 (0.527)
and Category 2 (0.540) would have winning percentages above 0.500, teams in
Category 3 (0.496) would have winning percentages near 0.500, and teams in
Category 5 (0.411) would have winning percentages below 0.500, but the high
winning percentage (0.539) of Category 4 teams is not expected (see Table 2). In
addition, Category 3 teams (0.021) showed the largest average change in winning
percentage while Category 1 (-0.025) and Category 5 (-0.062) teams both had, on
average, worse seasons in 2014 than in 2013, and Category 2 (0.009) and Category
4 (0.003) teams had only slightly better seasons in 2014. The combination of the
3rd best winning percentage and the 2 nd worst change in winning percentage for
Category 1 teams implies that analytics utilization is not helping these teams win
more games. However, Category 5 teams had the worst winning percentage and
the worst change in winning percentage (largest drop) which does support the
hypothesis qualitatively.
Average
Change
in
Change
in Winning
Winning
Percentage
Percentage
Standard
(2013-2014)
Deviation

Average
2014
Winning
Percentage

Winning
Percentage
Standard
Deviation

1

0.527

0.125

-0.025

0.099

2

0.540

0.130

0.009

0.113

Category
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3

0.496

0.154

0.021

0.131

4

0.539

0.119

0.003

0.153

5

0.411

0.170

-0.062

0.184

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of winning percentage and change in winning
percentage
Due to the categorical nature of the ESPN (2015) categorizations, correlations could
not be performed with these data against winning percentage, but regression
analysis showed a non-significant relationship in 2014 (p=0.130) and in the change
between 2013 and 2014 (p=0.654). Correlations were performed with the rankings
(top 10 and bottom 10) against winning percentage, but no significant correlations
existed for 2014 (p=0.137) or for the change in winning percentage between 2013
and 2014 (p=0.640).
The scatter plot of the teams’ winning percentages against their categorization
(Figure 1a) provides the best visualization of the lack of difference across
categories. Similarly, Figure 1b shows the scatter plot of the change in winning
percentage between 2013 and 2014 against the teams’ categorization.

2014 Winning Percentage
0.800
0.700

0.600
0.500
0.400
0.300
0.200

0.100
0.000
1

2
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5

Figure 1a: Scatter plot of winning percentage against categorization
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2014 Winning Percentage
Change from 2013
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Figure 1b: Scatter plot of change in winning percentage between 2013 and
2014 against categorization
In both figures, there is a relatively equal distribution across all five categories.
ANOVA tests show no significant difference across the five categories for winning
percentage or change in winning percentage (p=0.086 and p=0.453, respectively).
In Figure 1a, while the highest winning percentage is from Category 1 and the
lowest winning percentage is from Category 5 (and tied with a team from Category
3), the rest of the winning percentages are spread across all five categories. In fact,
the average winning percentage for Category 1 is the third highest at 0.527 with
Category 2 at 0.540 and Category 4 at 0.539. In Figure 1b, the biggest improvement
in winning percentage is from Category 4. The Category 1 teams had the narrowest
range of change in winning percentage, and the biggest change for any Category 1
team was far below the biggest change in the other categories. Perhaps the one
consolation is that Category 1 teams tended not to have substantially worse followup seasons as teams in the other categories.
The evidence does not support H1 – teams with higher analytics categorizations
and rankings do not have higher winning percentages than the other teams.
STADIUM ATTENDANCE
H2 states that teams with higher analytics categorizations and teams ranked in the
top 10 (compared to the bottom 10) should have higher attendance percentages than
teams categorized or ranked lower. Even if a team fails to win more games, the
team’s usage of analytics should make the games more competitive and therefore
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more attractive to the fans. Of course, if the team does win more games, the team
will be even more attractive to fans.
The attendance percentage of Category 1 teams (82.14%) is the lowest among all
five categories, and the attendance percentages for Categories 2-5 (90.43%,
89.51%, 89.20%, and 89.07%, respectively) are nearly identical to each other (see
Table 3). However, Category 1 teams (1.828) had the largest increase in attendance
percentage between 2013 and 2014 (implying 2013 was that much worse than 2014
in terms of attendance), and all other Categories had an average change in
attendance percentage between -1.000 and 1.000 (with Category 5 showing the 2 nd
largest increase at 0.890). The correlation (non-significant) between winning
percentage and attendance percentage is 0.18.

Average 2014 Attendance
Attendance
Percentage
Percentage
Standard
Deviation

Average
Change
in
Change
in Attendance
Attendance
Percentage
Percentage
Standard
Deviation
(2013-2014)

1

82.14

22.50

1.828

5.820

2

90.43

13.70

0.232

4.874

3

89.51

13.59

-0.018

7.225

4

89.20

14.06

-1.059

4.696

5

89.07

14.47

0.890

6.645

Category

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of attendance percentage and change in
attendance percentage
As with winning percentages, due to the categorical nature of the ESPN (2015)
categorizations, correlations could not be performed with these data against
attendance percentage, but regression analysis showed a non-significant
relationship in 2014 (p=0.449) and in the change between 2013 and 2014 (p=0.348).
Correlations were performed with the rankings (top 10 and bottom 10) against
attendance percentage, but no significant correlations existed for 2014 (p=0.591) or
for the change in attendance percentage between 2013 and 2014 (p=0.774).
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The scatter plot of the teams’ attendance percentages against their categorization
(Figure 2a) provides the best visualization of the lack of difference across
categories. Similarly, Figure 2b shows the scatter plot of the change in attendance
percentage between 2013 and 2014 against the teams’ categorization.

2014 Attendance Percentage
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Figure 2a: Scatter plot of attendance percentage against categorization
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2014 Attendance Percentage
Change from 2013
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Figure 2b: Scatter plot of change in attendance percentage between 2013 and
2014 against categorization
In both figures above, there is a relatively equal distribution across all five
categories. ANOVA tests show no significant difference across the five categories
for attendance percentage or change in attendance percentage (p=0.516 and
p=0.644, respectively). In Figure 2a, the highest attendance percentage and the
lowest attendance percentage are both from teams in Category 1. This impacts the
average attendance percentage for Category 1 which was the lowest among the five
categories. In Figure 2b, the biggest improvement in attendance percentage is from
Category 4 (also the case with winning percentage).
The evidence does not support H2 – teams with higher analytics categorizations
and rankings do not have higher attendance percentages than the other teams.
LEAGUE COMPARISONS
H3 states there is no difference in analytics’ impact across the four leagues. Table
4 presents the descriptive data for the 2014 season for the four leagues across the
two previously discussed variables of winning percentage and attendance
percentage. For the NHL, the average winning percentage is greater than 0.500 due
to the winning percentage calculation formula (described earlier) where
overtime/shootout losses are counted.
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First impressions from Table 4 reveal some interesting observations. Only in the
NBA does the highest winning percentage belong to the highest category (Category
1). In the other leagues, the highest winning percentage belongs to Category 2
(MLB), Category 4 (NFL), and Category 5 (NHL). While Category 1 teams in the
NFL and NHL have the second highest winning percentage, Category 1 teams in
the MLB have the third highest winning percentage. Keep in mind that in
Categories 1 and 5 in the NHL, there is only one team.

Average
2014 Average
2014
Winning Percentage
Attendance Percentage

League
(Category)

Count
of
Category

MLB

30

0.500

70.40

1

9

0.498

73.42

2

7

0.541

68.41

3

6

0.509

73.13

4

6

0.458

67.97

5

2

0.463

62.85

NBA

30

0.500

90.90

1

4

0.561

92.90

2

8

0.517

89.18

3

9

0.461

88.96

4

6

0.526

91.23

5

3

0.439

98.03

NFL

32

0.500

96.95

1

0

n/a

n/a
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2

9

0.535

98.13

3

7

0.455

96.56

4

12

0.568

96.91

5

4

0.297

95.10

NHL

30

0.562

96.57

1

1

0.652

117.6

2

13

0.556

97.72

3

12

0.540

94.01

4

3

0.610

96.80

5

1

0.683

90.50

Table 4: Summary data by league
Regression analyses performed for each league separately on winning percentage
and attendance percentage yielded no significant results (see Table 5). The lack of
significant differences is further evident in the scatter plots (Figure 3).
Regression
p-value
of Regression
p-value
of
Winning Percentage versus Attendance Percentage versus
Category
Category
League
MLB

0.118

0.432

NBA

0.423

0.539

NFL

0.333

0.354

NHL

0.504

0.100

Table 5: Regression analyses by league
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Figure 3: Scatter plots of MLB winning percentage and attendance percentage
against categorization for all four leagues
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The four sets of scatter plots in Figure 3 show relatively even distributions. In the
MLB, the highest winning percentage for a single team is from Category 3, and the
scatter plot clearly shows Category 2 teams with higher winning percentages than
Category 1 teams. The wider distribution of attendance percentages for Category
1 MLB teams includes the teams with both the highest and lowest individual
attendance percentages. In the NBA, there is the general trend of lower categories
associated with lower winning percentages (though not significantly so) as well as
the Category 1 outlier and the much wider range than in the MLB. The NBA
attendance percentages are nearly identical for Categories 2-4, and there is again an
outlier in Category 1 (the same outlier team in winning percentage – Philadelphia
76ers). The NFL scatter plots are more condensed with more teams in fewer
categories. Categories 2, 3, and 4 all have teams with very high winning
percentages (three of the five highest winning percentages are from Category 4
teams), and only Category 4 teams are excluded from any of the lowest winning
percentages. NFL games consistently have near-capacity attendance due to the
popularity of the sport. This is evident in the scatter plot of attendance percentage
which shows high percentages and narrow ranges for teams from every category.
Most of the teams in the NHL (25 out of 30) are in Categories 2 and 3, so there is a
heavy concentration in the scatter plots. However, every team in Categories 4 and
5 had a winning percentage over 0.500 and, like the NFL, the attendance percentage
for all teams is high. Due to the small and unbalanced team counts within the
categories within each of the leagues, additional statistical tests (such as ANOVA)
could not be performed.
In the end, the evidence does not support H3 – there is no difference in the impact
of analytics adoption across the four leagues.

DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Across the three hypotheses, no statistically significant results were found.
However, professional sports teams in these four leagues continue to adopt and
improve their analytics utilization. How can this trend be explained if there are no
empirical data to support such investments in staff, technology, and time? Where
is the return on investment for these teams who have spent time and money on
analytics efforts?
Perhaps it is unfair to expect results in such a short period of time. This could
potentially explain why there are no significant results using the ESPN (2015)
categorizations and the performance data from the 2014 season. Unfortunately,
categorizations for the 2013 season or the 2012 season (or any prior) are not
available to use against the performance results in the 2014 season. The question
remains, therefore, how long must a team wait before it will see measurable and
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consistent results in either winning percentage or attendance percentage, assuming
improvements will be seen at all? In other words, is there a measurable “lag time”
between analytics adoption/implementation and improvements in on-field or offfield performance? With most technology implementations, immediate results and
improvements are not possible.
Time is required between planning,
implementation, and some later point when the results of the technology utilization
can be realized. This could take weeks or months for a new social media effort,
and it could take years for a fully integrated ERP system. Analytics implementation
by professional sports teams is no different. Results may not be seen immediately.
Additionally, given the myriad of variables at play during any single game/match,
let alone an entire season, is it even fair to expect consistent improvements in any
of the measures used here? And if enough teams are utilizing analytics techniques,
will a measurable difference in performance be possible or is the competitive
advantage of analytics lost in its ubiquity? This is all assuming that teams who
have adopted analytics are utilizing analytics to their full potential, something that
needs further investigation.
LIMITATIONS
The primary limitation of this study is the reliance on the ESPN (2015) rankings
and categorizations. While based on descriptive data and the opinions of internal
and external experts, the rankings and categorizations are not perfect. Some would
argue that these rankings and categorizations are no better than subjective opinions
as the methodology for their creation is not available. Perhaps, but ESPN (the
network, the magazine, or the website) is seen as an authority.
A second limitation is the availability of only one year’s worth of performance data
since the rankings and categorizations were created. Although this is addressed in
the Future Research section below, it is a limitation in that the quantity of usable,
longitudinal data is limited.
Finally, winning percentage and attendance percentage were chosen for their
applicability to all of the leagues as well as their relative importance as measures
of on-field and off-field success. However, many more performance statistics exist
beyond these variables. Some of these statistics are applicable to all of the
professional leagues – point differential (points scored minus points allowed), home
vs away (home winning percentage minus away winning percentage), playoff
appearances or league championships, and team revenue – while many, if not most,
are sport-specific – team ERA or team OBP in baseball, team field-goal percentage
or team rebound differential in basketball, team tackles-for-loss or team total yards
from scrimmage in football, and team scoring chances or team power play
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efficiency in hockey. The full list of potential performance measures, especially
when sport-specific measures are included, is quite large and this study only
scratches the surface. However, whether a team scores more points than its
opponents or whether a team performs better at home or on the road is secondary
to overall wins.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Considering the unexpected results of the analyses, further research is warranted to
better understand the impact of analytics adoption by professional sports teams.
Attention should be paid to both the reasons and causes for analytics adoption as
well as the performance results stemming from analytics adoption.
Many possible approaches exist to better understand analytics adoption by
professional sports teams, but some of the possibilities include:
•

•

•

•
•

Look at how teams are utilizing analytics, and assess whether teams are
utilizing analytics to their full potential. Do teams with greater
utilization towards potential have greater on-field and off-field
performance success? Is there a difference between back-office
(general manager) utilization and on-field (coach or manager)
utilization?
Look at more in-depth data regarding how long teams have been
utilizing analytics, and assess the number of championships won as a
result of when analytics were adopted. Have teams who adopted
analytics before others won more championships (perhaps as a result of
time instead of utilization differences)?
Look at city (or metro area) population, and assess the impact of
population and market size on analytics adoption. Do teams in smaller
cities or markets have to utilize more analytics to field a winning team
and attract fans? Do teams in such markets adopt analytics earlier than
other teams in order to stay ahead?
Look at team value, and assess its impact on analytics adoption. Do
teams with lower value have to utilize more analytics to field a winning
team and attract fans (and hopefully increase their value)?
Look at performance measures in future seasons (2015, 2016, and
beyond), and assess the impact of the 2014 categorizations on future
performance. Do significant differences in on-field and off-field
performance arise in future seasons based on current analytics adoption
levels? Is there a measurable lag between adoption and performance
results?
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CONCLUSION
There is an apparent disconnect between the analytics hype in the professional
sports industries and the lack of measurable and significant performance results by
the teams. No significant differences were found in terms of winning percentage
or attendance percentage, and no significant differences were found within the
individual leagues. More research is needed (especially longitudinally) to further
understand this phenomenon, but until then, these data and analyses indicate
analytics adoption provides no on-field or off-field performance improvements.

APPENDIX
A listing of all 122 teams and their categorizations by ESPN (2015). Each league
is ordered first by category (1-5) and then alphabetically by team within each of the
five categories. Numbers in parentheses represent top 10 and bottom 10 rankings
out of all 122 teams.
MLB

NBA

NFL

NHL

Chicago
Boston Red Sox – Dallas Mavericks
Atlanta Falcons - 2 Blackhawks – 1
1 (5)
– 1 (8)
(10)
Chicago Cubs – 1

Houston Rockets Baltimore Ravens
Boston Bruins - 2
– 1 (3)
-2

Cleveland Indians Philadelphia
–1
76ers – 1 (1)

Cleveland Browns
Buffalo Sabres - 2
-2

Houston Astros – San
Antonio Dallas Cowboys - Columbus
1 (2)
Spurs - 1 (7)
2
Jackets - 2
New
York
Jacksonville
Atlanta Hawks - 2
Yankees – 1 (6)
Jaguars - 2

Blue

Edmonton Oilers
-2

Oakland A's – 1
Kansas City Chiefs Los
Angeles
Boston Celtics - 2
(9)
-2
Kings - 2
Pittsburgh Pirates Cleveland
–1
Cavaliers - 2
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St.
Louis
Philadelphia
Detroit Pistons - 2
Cardinals – 1
Eagles - 2

New
York
Islanders - 2

Tampa Bay Rays Golden
State San
Francisco Pittsburgh
– 1 (4)
Warriors - 2
49ers - 2
Penguins - 2
Baltimore Orioles Memphis
–2
Grizzlies - 2
Kansas
Royals – 2

Buffalo Bills - 3

City Oklahoma City
Chicago Bears - 3
Thunder - 2

St. Louis Blues - 2
Tampa
Bay
Lightning - 2

Los
Angeles Portland
Trail Green Bay Packers Toronto
Dodgers – 2
Blazers - 2
-3
Leafs - 2

Maple

New York Mets – Charlotte Hornets Miami Dolphins - Washington
2
-3
3
Capitals - 2
San Diego Padres
Oakland Raiders Indiana Pacers - 3
Winnipeg Jets - 2
–2
3
Toronto Blue Jays
Miami Heat - 3
–2

Seattle Seahawks - Arizona Coyotes 3
3

Washington
Nationals – 2

Tampa
Bay Calgary Flames Buccaneers - 3
3

Chicago
Sox – 3

Milwaukee
Bucks - 3

White Orlando Magic - Arizona Cardinals Carolina
3
-4
Hurricanes - 3

Los
Angeles
Phoenix Suns - 3
Angels – 3

Carolina Panthers Dallas Stars - 3
4

Milwaukee
Brewers – 3

Cincinnati Bengals Detroit
-4
Wings - 3

Sacramento
Kings - 3

Red

San
Francisco Toronto Raptors - Denver Broncos - Florida Panthers Giants – 3
3
4
3
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Seattle Mariners –
Utah Jazz - 3
3

Detroit Lions - 4

Texas Rangers – 3 Chicago Bulls - 4

Houston Texans - Nashville
4
Predators - 3

Montreal
Canadiens - 3

Arizona
Denver Nuggets - Indianapolis Colts New
Jersey
Diamondbacks - 4 4
-4
Devils - 3
Atlanta Braves – 4

Los
Angeles Minnesota Vikings Philadelphia
Clippers - 4
-4
Flyers - 3

Cincinnati Reds – Minnesota
New
Orleans San Jose Sharks 4
Timberwolves - 4 Saints - 4
3
Colorado Rockies New
Orleans New York Giants - Vancouver
–4
Pelicans - 4
4
Canucks - 3
Detroit Tigers – 4

Washington
Wizards - 4

Pittsburgh Steelers Anaheim Ducks -4
4

Minnesota Twins Brooklyn Nets –
St. Louis Rams - 4
-4
5 (118)

New
York
Rangers - 4

Miami Marlins – Los
Angeles New York Jets – 5 Ottawa Senators 5 (115)
Lakers – 5 (113) (114)
4
Philadelphia
Phillies – 5 (122)

Colorado
New York Knicks San
Diego
Avalanche
– 5 (121)
Chargers – 5 (119)
(117)

–

5

Tennessee Titans –
5 (116)
Washington
Redskins – 5 (120)
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